involved to deploy and sustain U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan and address options to overcome strategic-access challenges. The author proposes five recommendations to the current strategy, including: a need to strengthen regional partnerships; reduce dependence on Afghan-Pakistani Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC); re-establish a Northern Distribution Network; seek alternative, regional air bases; and improve InTransit Visibility (ITV) technology. To deploy and sustain up to sixty-thousand U.S. forces in Afghanistan, there must be a sound and executable strategic-access plan.
EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES FOR STRATEGIC ACCESS TO AFGHANISTAN
There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan.
-Robert M. Gates
The above quote highlights the importance of developing sound strategy for U.S. Marines, and supporting troops. These commitments represent a partial but still significant move toward meeting repeated requests from General McKiernan for more combat forces, a reinforcement the commander says is necessary to carry out the missions of counter-insurgency (COIN) operations and Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) training. 2 The relative combat power that the U.S. can generate is constrained by the nation's capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to this theater of operation.
3 This paper will focus on the status of strategic partnerships in the region as well as a review of current distribution and sustainment processes. It will explore alternative, strategic-access options, including air basing in the region and consideration of other, ground-distribution networks to alleviate the challenges with a single Pakistani GLOC currently sustaining Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces.
Finally, the paper will suggest improved technology solutions for In-Transit Support for our forces in Afghanistan is the most difficult logistics assignment we have faced since World War II. The timetable for accomplishing all of this has been compressed tremendously within the last couple of months, partially by the timetable that was negotiated in the status of forces agreement with Iraq and partially by the decision that has been made to accelerate the plus up of forces in Afghanistan. 4 Afghanistan requires a comprehensive review of sustainment support to determine if current practices can meet the logistics needs of a larger force. History proves that support to military forces operating in Afghanistan is difficult.
Afghanistan in Historical Context
For centuries, Afghanistan stood at the crossroads of great civilizations. 5 It served as the primary, land conduit connecting powerful empires of Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent. 6 Because of its strategic location, warfare has plagued the region since the beginning of recorded history. The country presents similar challenges today as it did to conquering armies over 2,500 years ago. The physical challenges of weather and terrain make operations difficult for any army. Afghanistan's narrow mountain passes and river valleys present an unrelentingly harsh environment.
7
Accentuated by mountain peak elevations in excess of 24,500 feet, the Hindu Kush, an extension of the Himalayan Mountains, roughly divides the country in two. The majority of the population lives above 2,000 feet elevation. The deep, narrow valleys, as well as the high mountains, historically served as important natural, defensive measures for the country. 8 Afghanistan today shares borders on the north with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan; on the northeast with a tip of China and Indian Kashmir; on the east and south with Pakistan; and on the west with Iran.
The Soviets experienced poor results in their logistics efforts during their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. As a land-locked country, Afghanistan is extremely mountainous in the north and east and mostly desert in the south and west.
Most significant to logisticians, Afghanistan lacks any significant transportation network.
Afghanistan has no railroad system and lacks navigable rivers. 9 The Soviets maintained one fragile line of communication from the town of Termez in present-day Uzbekistan, through the Hindu Kush via a 1. The JDDOC synchronizes End-to-End (E2E) distribution by focusing on those joint theater issues most affecting JFCs. They help prioritize requirements, measure performance, and recommend improvements concerning the overall effectiveness of the distribution chain. They assist the national logistics community and JFCs to develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) to achieve comprehensive visibility of U.S.
Government, allied, coalition, host-nation, and commercial assets transiting the AOR.
14 To this end, the U.S. seeks stronger cooperation within the region to maintain viable, strategic ALOCs and GLOCs throughout the AOR. However, a number of other dynamics are at work, creating unique political challenges to current and future strategic-access options. Two are particularly troublesome. Russia wishes to reestablish regional hegemony over their former Soviet territories 15 and unrest and uncertainty in Pakistan can potentially destabilize current GLOC access.
Challenges of Strategic Partnerships in the Region
Maintaining and expanding strategic access to Afghanistan is fraught with political challenges. With the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, Russia lost the lands and territories it had controlled for the better part of three centuries. 16 This collapse destroyed the rigid economic structure, which the Soviets had created, and many of the weak, democratic, successor regimes that emerged proved incapable of controlling the criminal gangs or creating functioning economies in the aftermath of the Soviet demise. 17 Since the 1990s, these newly-independent nations in the Caucasian, Black Sea, Caspian, and Inner-Asian regions struggled to find their identity. Civil wars, regional conflicts, terrorism, ethnic unrest, crime, human rights abuses, economic despair, and political instability plagued the region, including Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
Russia began playing a more active, but less constructive role, across parts of the region beginning in 2001. Russian involvement in each country has its own character, but they have in common a Russia that is reasserting itself into the affairs of its much-smaller neighbors. Russia plays on ethnic, national, and economic tension to extend or reassert its influence in its "near abroad." 18 The Russian near abroad is roughly described as the former republics or recognized, autonomous regions of the former USSR. In the Caucasian region, especially Georgia and the two breakaway shipments. Future, commercial shipping contracts should contain strong contract language that helps reduce pilferage, curb loss of property, and increase force protection.
By incorporating these five recommendations, strategic access to Afghanistan will improve and will build the necessary support infrastructure to sustain, deploy, and redeploy increased force commitments. Strategic access, or the inability thereof, can determine the difference between success and failure in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom.
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